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S E C R E T

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COUNTRY Hungary

REPORT

SUBJECT

History of the Hungarian Uprising

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a 21-page report giving the history of the anti-Communist uprising in Hungary in October and November 1956. The report is of more value historically than as positive information. The report covers the following material:

1. Attitudes among Hungarian Air Force officers before the Hungarian uprising.
2. The part played by Hungarian Air Force officers during the uprising.
3. (Appendix A) The part played by Hungarian youth and Soviet troops during the uprising.
4. (Appendix B) Resort to the wearing of Soviet uniforms by AVH members as a disguise during the uprising.

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HUNGARYPolitical/Air/MilitaryTHE STORY OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLT

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1. If one goes back into Hungarian history, it could be shown how the situation became progressively bad, until it was so tense that people reached the pitch where they would attack tanks with their bare fists.

2. It may appear to be going too far, but there can be no doubt that in the 1920's there was already a groundwork of anti-Communism, laid by the failure of Bela KUN's attempts at Communism. These attempts undoubtedly failed because of the alienation of peasant sympathies when their land was taken from them, and it can even be said that the Communist leaders of that period had no close contact with or understanding of the workers of the country. The Hungarians are at heart a God-fearing, patriotic people, not at all inclined to accept the idolisation of the U.S.S.R. preached as an integral part of Communist ideology. The memories of the Red Terror of the 1920's and the resulting hate of Communism were widespread in HUNGARY, and this deeply implanted hate was passed on with strict warnings to the coming generation against ever succumbing to Communism. The HORTY Government fostered and strengthened the feelings of patriotism in the people, and lost no chance of pointing to the lessons of the 1920's, so that [] in 1939 [] there were, in general, very few Communists, the workers being mainly Social Democrats, who tended to distrust those who tried to increase Communist influence amongst them.

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3. Towards the end of the War, there was a very deep-rooted fear in HUNGARY that if the Germans were victorious, HUNGARY's industries would be neglected, and the country would become nothing but a good producing area for GERMANY. On the other hand, there was a distinct and also deep-rooted fear of RUSSIA and the GPU. [] when the Russian "liberators" entered HUNGARY [] there was a great propaganda-poster campaign extolling the SOVIET UNION and the Russian fight for national socialism. [] however, [] looting and rape [] took place throughout the country, and [] the Hungarian people gradually came to think that the HORTY propaganda was not, in fact, so very far wrong.

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4. During the years 1945/46, there was a high degree of inflation in the country, and extreme poverty was felt by a large section of the population. Business enterprises were still in private ownership, but land reform was being introduced and big estates broken up. In 1948, when the Communists really took control, poverty was, in their hands, a very good argument for the nationalization of industry and the dispossession of bourgeois capitalists. This nationalization, it was claimed, would give the workers the prosperity they deserved, whilst in fact there was, by 1951, a one hundred per cent rise in the cost of living, whilst wages had risen only by twenty-five per cent. Moreover, in 1948, when rationing was ended, RAKOSI announced that any Government which reintroduced rationing would be committing political suicide. In 1951, of course, RAKOSI himself re-introduced meat rationing, a step which was taken very badly by the workers, who regarded it as a terrible breach of faith.

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H 5. The first Five-year Plan was introduced in 1951, and the resultant increase in armament production and heavy industry brought with it a distinct drop in the standard of living. The great rush to increase industrialisation could not be kept up without a drop in the standard of living and in wages, and the workers found that they were being required to work longer hours for no higher pay. The single-party system was now enforced, with Communist Trade Union leaders safely installed. Many of these Trade Union leaders were AVÖ spies, and the intrigues which resulted began a reign of terror which swept through HUNGARY.

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6. A factor which should not be under-estimated in the Hungarian abhorrence of Communism was the constant organization of mass meetings, which were frequently tacked on to the end of the normal working day, and allowed the workers no time for relaxation, nor for something which they greatly valued, home life and time to devote to their children. The Communist Party sponsored a wave of enthusiasm for everything Russian, the attitude being that "whatever is good for RUSSIA is good enough for HUNGARY", and trade pacts were made with RUSSIA which were very much to the disadvantage of HUNGARY. For example, [] the trade agreement which existed on the subject of bauxite, which was supplied to RUSSIA for aluminium extraction; this was then resold to HUNGARY for iron extraction.

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7. [] as to whether trade pacts did not in fact allow for supplies from RUSSIA to HUNGARY, or for monetary payments for materials exported to the U. S. S. R., [] a very large amount of goods had to be exported to RUSSIA to cover payments for arms and "advisors", "exported" by the U. S. S. R. to HUNGARY. Indeed, [] many pacts stipulated that arms and advisors would be provided by the U. S. S. R.

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8. [] in 1950, the Ministry of Defence, Air Force Headquarters and all Air Force units already had large numbers of Russian advisors.

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[] although these advisors did not appreciably increase in number after that date, their sphere of influence extended and as the Hungarian Air Force grew, the Russian advisors attempted to influence every phase of its development. Pressure was constantly being brought to bear upon Hungarian Air Force officers at all levels to organize their sections on Russian lines, and even in matters of supply this Russian influence was felt as, for example, when in 1952 the Hungarian Air Force was issued with Russian-type uniforms, and in 1955 Hungarian pilots were issued with the typical black breeches worn by Russian pilots. Disciplinary regulations were also brought into line with the Russian pattern, and furthermore, the traditional Hungarian leave regulations were altered to conform with the much less human Russian method.

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[] the Russian "Advisors" were very much in control, and whatever they "advised" had to be carried out - unless some method could be found for procrastination. As an example, [] the takeover in 1953 of some T.U.2's, when a Hungarian officer was sent to the Hungarian/Russian frontier, and refused to accept these old, 1940 aircraft as being unsatisfactory. The Russian whose job it was to hand over the aircraft immediately telephoned the Hungarian Air Force Headquarters in BUDAPEST, and the Hungarian officer was duly informed that he must accept the aircraft, no matter what their condition. This was not the end of the story, incidentally, as the Hungarian Air Force captain was definitely marked down for the future as one who had dared to raise his voice against the Russian advisors.

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9. [redacted] the officer corps of the Hungarian Air Force was incensed at this treatment and the unpleasant dependence of their service on the Russians. They were, moreover, extremely annoyed by the stories told them by interpreters of the luxury in which the Russian advisors lived, a luxury which came from the pockets of the Hungarian people. [redacted]

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there was a gradual, but very definite, build-up of resentment within the Hungarian Air Force officer corps against all things Russian.

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[redacted], however, [redacted] this resentment did not exist one hundred per cent, as one could divide the officers, both at the Headquarters and on operational airfields, into two groups. There were those officers who, although perhaps not Communists at heart, felt that their profession and livelihood were at stake, and that if the Russians were in control the only thing to do was to make the best of things by joining the Party, ingratiating themselves with the Russian advisors, and making sure that they were chosen for administrative courses of instruction in the SOVIET UNION, a selection which was important in determining an officer's future appointments. The other group of officers, who did not consider self-advancement a sufficient reason for falling in with Communism, carefully avoided their pro-Communist brother officers. It was extremely difficult to assess which officers were pro- and which anti-Russian, and there was, therefore, very little organized discussion on the question of Russian influence in the Hungarian Air Force. There were, it is true, small private meetings of intimate friends, who would meet either at their homes or in cafes, but they realised that the Russian control was too widespread to be resisted, and there was never any thought that they might be able to do anything to overthrow this control. The favourite method of resistance was a form of go-slow strike, possible because orders, coming of course, indirectly, from the Russians, were often contradictory; officers could, if they were so minded, fail to carry out in full detail re-organization on the Russian pattern, and in certain cases [redacted]

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[redacted] of daily aircraft and spare part returns, [redacted] quantities of spares were left to deteriorate with inadequate protection. [redacted]

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[redacted] in industry the situation was very much worse, and this go-slow sabotage campaign was very obvious [redacted] from returns showing the ever-increasing number of "unserviceable" spare parts being produced by factories, and being rejected by Air Force acceptance officers. Moreover, the TÖKÖL aircraft repair establishment was continually increasing the number of aircraft which they certified to be completely unserviceable and there was, in fact, one case of actual sabotage of a jet fighter, [redacted] this spirit of sabotage became most noticeable, [redacted] with the second RAKOSI "restoration", in early 1956.

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10. The situation both within the Hungarian Air Force and throughout the country became progressively worse, and people began to talk openly about the injustices, broken promises and undesirable Russian influence in the country. At no point [redacted]

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[redacted] revolution was inevitable, not even at the final students' demonstration on 23rd October. After RAKOSI's resignation at the end of July, 1956, the Writers' Association, which had been disbanded after RAKOSI's second restoration, came into being again; and their own newspaper again achieved circulation. The articles in this paper became more and more critical, and [redacted] the officer corps both of the Hungarian Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft service followed these articles with great interest.

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11. The Writers' Association paper had a strictly limited circulation, and all over BUDAPEST long queues could be seen forming to

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obtain it, the limitation on circulation being easily circumvented by passing copies from hand to hand. Early in September, 1956 an article appeared in this paper by a Hungarian Communist who had lived for some time in the U.S.S.R. This article was extremely critical, being an attack on the KUSCERA and the Government's lack of contact with the Hungarian people. Such articles excited such enormous interest all over the country that work was almost at a standstill, and when further articles appeared on the subject of REIK's rehabilitation, etc., the excitement aroused among the population was so intense that, for example, absolutely no work was done for some 24 hours in the Air Force Headquarters nor, [redacted] on many of the Hungarian airfields.

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12. [redacted] the Russian advisors remained in the Air Force Headquarters until 23rd October, one of them, indeed, having been seen around even on the 24th. They behaved, however, as if absolutely nothing was happening, calling the Hungarian officers in for "consultations", as was the normal practice, and giving no indication that they had heard anything of the student meetings and threats of demonstrations.

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[redacted] Since the Russian advisors stolidly refused to give any indication of their knowledge that trouble of some kind was brewing in the city, there was virtually no change in the relationship between them and the Hungarian Air Force officers, except perhaps that the protestations of co-operation made by the Hungarian officers were rather less convincing, and the Hungarian interpreters tended to become slightly less polite to the Russian advisors. A distinct change was noticeable, however, in the relations between pro-Russian Hungarian officers and their colleagues. These pro-Russian Air Force officers were, of course, quite aware of the situation in the city, and as they were in opposition to the present political trend, they had no common ground whatever for any discussion with the anti-Russian body of officers. The former officers tended to withdraw among themselves more and more, and to stick more closely than ever to the Russians.

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13. One aspect of their behaviour was that as the situation deteriorated, these pro-Russian officers did attempt to thwart the go-slow policy of the other members of the Headquarters. An example of this was the accusation made by the Lieutenant-Colonel in charge of finance, PINTER, of sabotage to the tune of several million forints. He asserted that the industrial section of the Air Force Engineering Service had grossly over-estimated the amount of repairs required, and had thus authorised a payment to the aircraft repair establishments of sums vastly beyond the capacity of these establishments. The accusation was sent up to a General MADAR/SZ who in turn sent it back to the Head of the Air Force, (Colonel) NADOR. NADOR passed the accusation to [redacted]

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[redacted] with a request that they should answer it point by point, a request extremely easily fulfilled, as in fact the engineers' estimates had been of the essential repairs required, and their department had nothing to do with the actual allocation of money.

NADOR's action in passing on the accusation was based on the fact that NADOR was anti-Russian, and knew that his officers could refute the pro-Russian PINTER's accusations.

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14. [redacted] at BUDAPEST Uni-
[redacted] the situation existing

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/within the University

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within the University, and on the attitude of the students to the Russian control in HUNGARY. [redacted] the majority of students at the University were those with a normal Party background, who were considered completely reliable politically.

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15. During the first two years of a student's studies, Bolshevik Party History was a compulsory subject, and during the second year, Soviet Political Economy. [redacted] this very fact is a contributory factor in the deterioration of the student body's attitude towards the SOVIET UNION, because they were able to see for themselves that the theory which they were forced to study and which formed the basis of the Soviet system, was completely divorced from reality, and that the practical results of these theories' application was the poverty from which their country was suffering.

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[redacted] the students lived mainly in [redacted] which formed a natural meeting-place, and [redacted] from 1951 onwards informal discussion groups were constantly being held, when newspaper articles and points of Soviet economic theory were discussed. In 1955, this type of discussion, and the anti-Russian arguments which were always put forward at these meetings became much more open, and when the XXth Party Congress denounced STALIN, the students were openly and sceptically amused. They quite flatly refused to believe that the mistakes which were now being admitted were the fault of STALIN, and not of the Communist system, nor could they accept in good faith the protestations of anti-Stalinism now being made by ex-Stalinists. The Communist Party, of course, did its best to counteract the students' informal discussions, and it was still compulsory to attend a certain number of Communist Party lectures; however, [redacted] students would attend these compulsory meetings, clap politely and loudly, and then return to their own rooms to tear the lecture to shreds.

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16. The students and the Writers' Association were very closely linked, and [redacted] with the appearance of the Writers' Association article, discussion in student circles became much more widespread and more openly critical.

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17. On 19th October, 1956, a University students' meeting was held in SZEGED, when various points were drawn up to be put to the Government. These included the usual demands for the punishment of those responsible for REIK's death, questions about Hungarian uranium and demands for the improvement of student conditions. The meeting stated that if these demands had not been complied with by 23rd October, students would take part in a silent protest march in BUDAPEST. An account of this meeting was published in the Communist Party newspaper "Soviet Youth", on 20th or 21st October, 1956.

18. On 21st October, [redacted]

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[redacted] "HETFOI HIPLAP", which had now been printing for several weeks, was full of pretty open criticism, and on this occasion, as on others, there were feverish crowds trying to obtain copies of the paper, which carried reports and comments on the students' SZEGED meeting.

19. On 22nd, the news travelled like wildfire through the city that a meeting was to be held at the University during the afternoon. This meeting began at three o'clock, and continued until midnight. Some 5,000 people attended; these included students, members of the University staff, factory representatives and hundreds of other

/civilians.

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civilians. There was a liberal sprinkling of military officers present. At the meeting, a list of points was drawn up, which was then run off on duplicators and copies distributed to representatives of all classes. A decision was taken at this meeting to join in the silent demonstration which had been fixed by the SZECED meeting for 23rd October, at 1500 hours. A large number of students wanted the points drawn up at the meeting to be read out on the radio immediately, and a deputation was sent to arrange this. The deputation soon returned, with the report that their request had been refused, and there was a furious outburst of ill-feeling against the authorities as a result, which the University staff tried in vain to quieten to some extent. The various points drawn up by the meeting are probably very well known, but for the record

including:

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1. Soviet troops to leave HUNGARY immediately.
2. Demand for an immediate Hungarian Government announcement about the question of Hungarian uranium being exploited by the Russians.
3. No secret trade pacts to be formed with other countries.
4. Imre NAGY to form a new Government, which should not contain any members of the RAKOSI clique.
5. FARKAS to be put on trial for his part in the REIK scandal.
6. Russian-type uniforms to be abolished in favour of the old Hungarian uniforms.
7. Work norms to be reduced to a reasonable level.
8. Better conditions for students.
9. Higher scholarships for students.
10. Free and secret elections to be held immediately.
11. Complete religious freedom.
12. Freedom of the Press.
13. Equality with the U.S.S.R. on all matters.
14. No compulsory produce quotas for farmers.
15. Reintroduction of the old Hungarian coat-of-arms.

20. [redacted] originally fourteen points were drawn up, but [redacted] these were constantly being altered and added to, and the final list presented on 23rd October included some sixteen points.

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21. On 23rd October, the tension in the Hungarian Air Force Headquarters was terrific, all the officers on duty simply sitting round doing nothing and talking about the meeting held the day before. Eventually, the "Party Secretary" of the Headquarters [redacted] admitted that he had been at the meeting the day before. This brought forth similar confessions from almost every other officer present at the Headquarters.

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22. During the morning of the 23rd, [redacted]

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[redacted] the Ministry of the Interior [redacted] banned the demonstration planned for that afternoon, [redacted]

23. In the afternoon, [redacted]

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[redacted] the crowd of demonstrators [redacted] were on their way to the Parliament Building to present the 16-point ultimatum.

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[redacted] the atmosphere was in no way one of revolution; it was one of tremendous patriotism, which showed itself, for example, at the Ministry of the Interior where the crowd demanded that the AVO's on guard should fly the Hungarian flag, a request which was speedily complied with. The whole demonstration was completely spontaneous, and the crowd gathered size and momentum on its way to Parliament Square. [redacted] the change from a peaceful demonstration to imminent revolt took place in Parliament Square around 5 p.m., when slogans were shouted, such as "Out with the Russians"; "Out with GERO", and when no member of the Government came out to speak to the demonstrators. The actual outbreak of fighting, however, took place at the Radio Station, where a delegation had gone to demand the immediate broadcast of the sixteen-point ultimatum. This delegation was invited to enter the Radio Building, and did not reappear. As a result of this, the crowd who had accompanied them began to throw missiles at the Radio Building. AVO's used tear-gas, and the Fire Brigade, with fire hoses, attempted to disperse the crowd. The situation rapidly deteriorated into open fighting. [redacted]

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[redacted] the first Hungarian troops who turned out to quell the riot were quite calmly sent back to their barracks by the crowd (and appeared in no way upset at being told to do so).

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[redacted] the AVO's who were surrounded in the various buildings were supplied with ammunition and reinforcements brought to them [redacted]

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24. Fighting went on throughout the night of the 23rd October, and on the 24th [redacted]

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[redacted] In the early morning, [redacted] the only broadcasts were music, with the regular announcement of an amnesty for all those who would lay down their arms by a certain time. It was also announced that GERO had resigned, that KADAR had been appointed Party Secretary, and that NAGY had formed a new Government. At 2 p.m., [redacted]

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[redacted] fighting was still going on. [redacted]

25. On the morning of Thursday, 25th October, orders were given over the radio for all military personnel to report immediately to their offices or barracks. This radio broadcast did its best to give the impression that law and order had been restored, and that the city was once again quiet. [redacted] Headquarters on GELLERT Hill;

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[redacted] three Hungarian tanks were stationed outside the H.Q., and that some 800 Hungarian infantry were inside the courtyard. Only some 20% of the officer strength of the H.Q. had actually reported back, a situation which continued for several days.

/Those who were present

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Those who were present had mainly been called in by Major KAUFMANN, on the direct orders of General MADARASZ, who had sent out this call on his own responsibility, the Defence Ministry being completely out of action, as the troops on guard there had gone over to the revolutionaries.

Colonel MALETTER was in command in the MARIA THERESA Barracks, and [] was on the side of the revolutionaries. Very little was done during the 25th October, and most of the 26th, since, as already stated, the Ministry of Defence was completely useless, and the majority of the senior army generals appeared to have gone into hiding. The Military Commandant of BUDAPEST had taken refuge in the Air Force Headquarters, and was trying to bring pressure to bear on General MADARASZ to form Air Force infantry units "to fight the Fascists". The officers in the Headquarters were ordered by Major KAUFMANN to draw pistols and ammunition, and to await further orders. The majority of the officers held informal meetings to discuss the situation and it was decided that even if ordered, they would not fire on crowds of civilians. Officers put their point of view to the other ranks in the Headquarters, and found that they had general support.

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26. It would appear that during this period (Colonel) NADOR and (Colonel) NAGY of the Anti-Aircraft Command were busy keeping their outlying forces in order and ensuring that there was no wholesale desertion, a factor which resulted in the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command being an orderly and still well-organised body at a later stage in the hostilities.

27. On the morning of 27th October, General MADARASZ, acting on further pressure from the Hungarian Military Commandant of BUDAPEST, gave orders for a force to go out from the Air Force H.Q. to destroy one of the barricades which had been erected in the city. This force set off in a convoy of one Hungarian tank, eight [] and following them, one tank. Three-quarters of the way to their destination, the first tank stopped, the officers got out, and stated that they had no intention of going any further. The rest of the force followed their example, and they all duly returned to the Air Force H.Q., where a meeting was held outside in the courtyard. (Lieutenant-Colonel) PATERKA, a Pioneer officer, was appointed spokesman for the force, and instructed to enter the H.Q. and inform General MADARASZ of the decision. MADARASZ received PATERKA, and on being informed that his order had not been carried out, exploded with anger, and said that if he issued an order, it had to be obeyed. It was then suggested to General MADARASZ that if he insisted on the force carrying out his instructions, perhaps he might care to lead the force in the action, whereupon the order was withdrawn.

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28. On the evening of Saturday, 27th October, a meeting of officers from the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command was held in the Air Force H.Q., when lectures on the present military and political situation were given by a (Major) KIS of the Anti-Aircraft Command. From 27th to 29th October, further informal discussions were held amongst officers of the Air Force, when it was decided that they were, in general, in favour of the revolution, and would join with officers of the Anti-Aircraft Command who shared these feelings, to form some sort of Revolutionary Council.

29. [] at no time did Colonel NADOR take any open part in these discussions. NADOR was completely preoccupied at this time with the question of attempting to maintain order within the Hungarian Air Force. All day long, a continuous flow of radio and telephone messages was arriving at the Air Force H.Q. from operational units at airfields throughout HUNGARY, asking what action should be

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taken, and to these queries NADOR's invariable reply was that no provocative action should be taken against the Russian troops, and that as soon as the situation became clear, further orders would be issued. The operational units in BUDAÖRS and at other airfields east of the DANUBE were, however, constantly occupied in reconnaissance flights, and reports of Russian troop dispositions and movements were relayed all through this period to the Air Force H.Q.

30. On the morning of Tuesday, 30th October, it was decided to form, from the Headquarters staff, an Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command Revolutionary Council. After the meeting at which this was decided, Major KIS went and had a discussion with Colonel NADOR, and then all the Headquarters officers, including NADOR, packed themselves into General MADARASZ's room, and informed him of the decision, NADOR, Major KIS, a (Major) KUTASI of the Industrial Section and a (Captain) SZERADAI acting as spokesmen. General MADARASZ was then gently propelled into the Central hall of the Headquarters, where all ranks of the staff were assembled, and there handed over complete command of the Hungarian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command to the Revolutionary Council, whose members were to be elected by secret ballot.

31. While MADARASZ was relinquishing command, SZERADAI and some other officers were busy drawing up a revolutionary proclamation. This stated that a Revolutionary Council of the Hungarian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command had been formed, that the Council was completely on the side of the Hungarian nation in its present struggle, and that it fully supported the sixteen-point manifesto prepared by the students. The revolutionary proclamation further stated that the Council was in agreement with the wish of the Hungarian people that the Russian troops should leave the country, and stated that if this demand was not met by 15th November, 1956, the Revolutionary Council would take the necessary military steps to support the Hungarian freedom fighters.

32. This revolutionary proclamation was then brought into the main hall, and read out to the assembled members of the Headquarters staff. It received an enthusiastic reception; when an addendum had been proposed and agreed saying: "Through fire and water the revolutionary council will defend its country", arrangements were made for the printing of the proclamation and its distribution. The proclamation was distributed the same evening throughout BUDAPEST, and taken to outlying airfields, where arrangements were made for pamphlets to be dropped from aircraft.

33. The meeting then proceeded to appoint 30 candidates to stand for election to the Revolutionary Council, which was to have 22 members. As a result of the ballot, NADOR became President of the Council; Major KIS, Major KUTASI and Captain SZERADAI were amongst the members elected.

34. One of NADOR's first actions on assuming command was to order the arrest of all AVO and counter-espionage officers within the Air Force H.Q.

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The Proclamation appeared in the Hungarian press on 30th/31st October, together with a similarly worded proclamation in the Army newspaper.

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40. One of the first actions of the Revolutionary Council was to remove political figures as quickly as possible from the forces, and the arrest was ordered of (Brigadier-General) HAZAI, Janos, (Brigadier-General) TOTH, Lajos, and (Brigadier-General) KOVACS, Istvan. Another action of the council was to open the airfield of FERIEGY [redacted] so that food and supplies for the city could be landed. An Air Force Major was put in charge of this airfield, and made directly responsible to Colonel NADOR as the Air Member of the General Revolutionary Council.

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41. As soon as the Air Force Revolutionary Council and Anti-Aircraft Revolutionary Council had been formed on 30th October, NADOR had taken steps to organise on a more regular basis the reconnaissances

/which had previously

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which had previously been taking place. From then until 1st November, regular reports were being received at the Air Force H.Q. of the floods of Russian troops pouring over the frontier into HUNGARY, and of Russian tank units surrounding Hungarian airfields. In reply to frantic telephone conversations with airfield commandants NADOR gave very strict instructions that despite these Russian troop movements, no action whatever must be taken, because HUNGARY had declared her neutrality and there must be no provocative action against Russian troops.

42. NADOR evidently felt very strongly, a Cease-Fire having been agreed on 28th October, that it was most important not only for HUNGARY to observe the Cease-Fire as a point of honour, but also that no incidents of provocation of the Russian troops by Hungarians should be allowed, as this would give the Russians a perfectly good excuse to re-open hostilities on the grounds that they were fighting against "Fascist cliques". National unity, he felt, was the only real weapon which could effectively be used against the Russian forces.

43. On Thursday, 1st November, the information concerning the Russian influx into HUNGARY was so serious that NADOR decided to send two members from the Air Force Revolutionary Council to the Students' Revolutionary Council, with the information he had amassed on Russian troop movements, planning that a joint approach should then be made to the General Revolutionary Council, who in turn were to pass a warning to Imre NAGY.

44. It may appear strange that if NADOR's information was so serious, he should not himself have taken some more direct action, as a member of the General Revolutionary Council, but many of the "Ministerial" offices were still infested with Stalinists, and that NADOR wanted support for his approach to the General Revolutionary Council (whose President, JANZA, was a well-known ex-Stalinist), and thus to Imre NAGY. Moreover, NADOR felt it to be essential that in the atmosphere of hate and suspicion which prevailed in the country, no action should be taken by himself as the head of a powerful and well-organised group in any direct negotiations with the Government, where his motives would be open to misrepresentation, and his strenuous efforts to obtain co-ordination of all freedom-loving Hungarians thus destroyed. NADOR had, from the very beginning, realised the necessity for co-ordination and had, with this in view, appointed liaison officers to all the various Revolutionary Councils which had been formed. Not only this, but he had forged links with the political parties which had, in the meantime, been formed, and had done everything in his power to impress upon them the necessity for concentrating exclusively on national unity, even to the extent of forgetting what might be major political differences. This is the background against which his apparently slow action in warning NAGY must be considered.

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45. Also on 1st November, (Brigadier) GÖGENYI, (former Inspector-General of the Hungarian Armed Forces - who was arrested after REIK's fall and who had been rehabilitated in 1956, but not yet reinstated in his military position), who was now acting as Military Adviser to the Students' Revolutionary Council, asked Colonel NADOR to let him know what information he had available about the influence of Russian troops, and what troops, aircraft, etc., were at their disposal, so that he could form a picture of the defence it would be possible to put up against the Russians.

46. On the strength of the information which he received, GÖGENYI decided that BUDAPEST could not hold out for more than forty-eight hours.

/As a result

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As a result of this decision, two members of the University Students' Revolutionary Council and two members of the Air Force Revolutionary Council went to the General Revolutionary Council H.Q. in the Ministry of Defence, and informed Colonel JANZA of the decision. JANZA appeared to be completely shocked at the analysis which he was given, and after consultation, he and four other members of the General Revolutionary Council went to see Imre NAGY.

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it was as a result of this analysis of the situation, imparted to Imre NAGY on 1st/2nd November, that NAGY decided that BUDAPEST could not possibly defend itself, and that the only way to save the situation was to withdraw from the WARSAW Pact, thus destroying the legal basis for the presence of Russian troops in HUNGARY.

47. The decision to withdraw from the Pact and NAGY's radio announcement to this effect having been made, Colonel MALETTER was promoted to Brigadier-General, and authorised by NAGY to negotiate with the Russians for the withdrawal of their troops from HUNGARY. Major-General JANZA who, as previously stated, was really a Stalinist at heart and had only been carried along with the Revolutionary Council as a figurehead, was formally deposed, and MALETTER appointed Head of the Revolutionary Council.

48. On the 2nd and 3rd November there were an incredible number of outbursts of jubilation throughout the city, when Hungarian troops were to be seen marching all round the town, loudly acclaimed by the population, who were all ready to return to work on Monday, 5th November, and to set the country's economy on its feet. The impression was that the population had now awakened to the tremendous victory which had been achieved. Law and order were completely restored in BUDAPEST. There was no looting of any kind, and the orderly state of affairs was typified by the collections which were being taken for the relief of the victims of the fighting; the collection-boxes for this purpose were lying quite unguarded at points all over the city, and constantly being filled with money. Rumours of racial persecution during these two days are absolutely untrue, nor was there any outbreak of mob hysteria, with a resultant attempt to search and mete out rough punishment to AVO's. The general attitude towards the Secret Police at this period was definitely one of waiting until these miscreants could be apprehended and dealt with legally. Workers' Councils had now been formed, both in BUDAPEST and in other parts of the country, and the National Guard was already functioning as an efficient police force on 2nd/3rd November. Russian troops had completely withdrawn from BUDAPEST itself, but were dug in on the outskirts of the city, mainly to the south-west.

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49. On the morning of 3rd November, [] a document circulating in the Air Force H.Q. on the proposed re-organization of the Hungarian Air Force. In this, it was recommended that (Brigadier-General) HORVATH, Barna should take command of the combined Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command, in place of Brigadier-General MADARASZ. Major KIS, previously in charge of the Anti-Aircraft Command, was recommended as Chief of Staff to HORVATH. (HORVATH had been, until 1950, Chief of Staff to General MADARASZ, and he was well liked in the Hungarian Air Force and respected as an extremely able officer.) It was further recommended in this document that General MADARASZ, (Colonel) GALOCZSI and (Colonel) MENNYHART should be removed from their posts. Further recommendations which had been passed by the Air Force Revolutionary Council for approval by the General Revolutionary Council and the Government were the reintroduction of the old Hungarian uniform and of a return to traditional Hungarian disciplinary and leave regulations. The further recommendation was the abolishment of the political Department in the Hungarian Air Force and the creation in its place of an

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education service. This latter recommendation was made on the basis of "no politics in the armed forces".

50. During the 2nd and 3rd November regular day and night reconnaissances were still being flown by Hungarian Air Force planes from airfields at BUDAORS and others east of the DANUBE (the night flights were made in MIG-17-PF's), and a stream of reports was arriving in the Air Force H.Q. giving information on the ever-increasing flow of Russian troops and armour crossing the Hungarian frontier at CSAP. At the same time, reports reached the Air Force H.Q. from Hungarian Air Force units west of the DANUBE that Russian troops were streaming into the country from across the Czechoslovak frontier.

51. On 2nd or 3rd November a message was received at the Air Force H.Q. from FERIHEGY Airfield, which was commanded by a Major CSALOKOZI, to say that someone [redacted] had arrived at the airfield [redacted] to make an offer to the Hungarian revolutionary forces of 15,000 anti-tank weapons (PANZERFAUSTER). [redacted]

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[redacted] this offer was definitely discussed by the Air Force Revolutionary Council, and [redacted] this council was making a unanimous recommendation to the General Revolutionary Council that the offer should be accepted. This information was direct from members of the Air Force Revolutionary Council. Nothing further came of the offer, however, because of the Soviet action on the morning of the 4th.

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52. On Friday, 2nd November, NAGY had a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, and asked what action the Russians now intended to take on the question of troop withdrawals from HUNGARY. The Ambassador's reply was that the Russians were merely awaiting a contact with them to be made by Brigadier-General MALETTER for detailed discussions on the phases of withdrawal. Consequently, on the morning of Saturday, 3rd November, MALETTER had a first meeting with the Russians, and duly reported back to Imre NAGY that discussions were proceeding extremely well. He stated that the Russians had agreed to all the main points regarding the withdrawal, and that it was now merely a question of MALETTER taking back with him to a second meeting the necessary military experts to discuss the technical difficulties of the various minor aspects. It should be noted here that HUNGARY had, in the preliminary negotiations, declared its readiness to feed Russian troops and to tend their wounded until the withdrawal; and, moreover, to place at their disposal all necessary transport. The discussions at the second meeting were, therefore, to have been concerned only with detail, even down to the question of what type of official send-off should be given to the last Soviet troops to leave.

53. On the evening of Saturday, 3rd November, MALETTER left for his second meeting with the Russians, from which he did not return, and on the same evening, still fully believing that the Soviet withdrawal was only a matter of days, NAGY's Government held an official reception to celebrate Hungarian independence. On the evening of Saturday, 3rd November, Colonel NADOR and many of the officers of the H.Q. went home. [redacted]

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[redacted] There were, in the Headquarters building, or in the courtyard, 400-500 Hungarian infantry troops, three Hungarian tanks, and there was a guard on the main gate of one officer and five men. Between three and four in the morning, on the morning of Sunday, 4th November, [redacted] officers were rudely [redacted]

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awakened when the light in their room was switched on and armed Russians poured in. They were forced to dress, and hurried into one room, where all officers had been gathered; other ranks were collected in a large assembly hall in the building. It subsequently transpired that an attack had been made on the Air Force H.Q. by some 40/50 Russian tanks which had completely surrounded the building, and 40/50 armoured troop-carrying vehicles, each with some ten Russian soldiers aboard. A frontal attack had been made on the main gate, and the officer and guards had been shot.

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[redacted] Russian troops had entered the city from the direction of BUDAÖRS.

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54. For two days the officers were kept prisoner in the Air Force H.Q., which was taken over by Russian troops, who occupied the Commander's offices and the radio [redacted] and telephone exchange. At mid-day on Tuesday, 6th November, General MADARASZ and Colonel GÁLCOCZI appeared in the Headquarters and proceeded to give the assembled officers political lectures on what had happened. They informed the officers that KADAR had now formed a Government, and that he had requested Russian assistance in suppressing Fascist revolutionaries; MADARASZ then said that the officers were free to leave the building, and suggested that they should all pull together and begin to build up the Hungarian Air Force once more. [redacted] the action of General MADARASZ in giving this lecture was quite in keeping with his whole attitude. He had, in the course of the discussions leading up to the formation of the Revolutionary Council, put in a plea for inclusion as a member of the Council, on the grounds "that he was one of the simple workers" ("Kinda des Folkes"). (Indeed, up to 1949, MADARASZ had in fact been an ordinary coal-miner!) He had, therefore, never recognised the authority of the Air Force Revolutionary Council, nor its decision to remove him from command of the Air Force, and welcomed the KADAR statement that changes made by the Revolutionary Councils during the uprising were null and void. General MADARASZ and Colonel GÁLCOCZI and Colonel MENNYHART were quite happy to carry on their duties as hirelings of the puppet KADAR Government, and it was their intention to form the officers of the Air Force into special officer militia units for the preservation of law and order in the country. MADARASZ appeared to receive scant courtesy from the Russians during this visit to the Headquarters, and was quite obviously scared and very worried about his own position. At the conclusion of the meeting he gave instructions that the officers should report back to the Air Force H.Q. on Monday, 12th November.

H 55. As already stated Colonel MADOR had spent the night of 3rd November at home. It would appear that information that the AVO and the Russians were after him must have been passed to MADOR on the Sunday, because on that day he made a dash for freedom in his official car and, although wounded in the arm by a Russian or AVO group who were on the watch for him, he managed to reach the safety of the Yugoslav Embassy.

H 56. [redacted] Thursday, 8th November, [redacted] the fighting had died down [redacted] During this period the Russians were in complete control of the Air Force H.Q.

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57. On Saturday, 10th November, a radio announcement was made by MUNICH Ferenc, that all officers living in BUDA were to report by 4 p.m. on Sunday 11th November to the PETÖFI barracks in BUDAÖRS; all officers living in PEST were to report to the ZRINYI Barracks in

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[redacted] officers who had reported to the PETOFI Barracks on Sunday, 11th November, [redacted] a talk had been given there by (Brigadier-General) HORVATH Mikhail, who had informed the assembled officers that a decision had now been taken that there would be no Hungarian armed forces during the next two years. Instead, it was proposed to form a national officer militia force for the preservation of "law and order", and to continue the fight against "Fascist reactionaries". This force would be made up of army, air force, navy and police. HORVATH stated that it would not be compulsory for officers to join this force, units of which he said were already being formed. Those officers who declined to join the force would be allowed to resign.

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[redacted] the Air Force H.Q. on GELLERT Hill, all Hungarians had been ejected from the building, which was now entirely in Russian hands. [redacted] the new Hungarian Air Force H.Q. had been set up in what was previously the offices of the Engineering Service of the Air Force, at IBRAHIM Utca, 2, (on the corner of AGAR Utca).

59. General MADARASZ and his staff had set up their offices in this building;

[redacted] it was hoped to be able to form a special and elite Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command unit of the proposed officer militia. This idea was an attempt on the part of the senior officers to show the Russians that this part of the Hungarian Armed Forces was loyal to the Russians. What Major HINEK did not realise at the time that he was explaining this grand plan to co-operate with the Russians was that informal meetings had been held amongst the officers at the Headquarters, when a majority of approximately 80% had already decided that they would not take part in this militia, and were on the point of resigning their commissions.

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60. This decision was communicated to the H.Q. staff on the same day, and those officers who had decided to resign left for their homes, having been instructed to report to the H.Q. on 15th November to draw their pay.

61. When those officers who had decided to resign reported for pay to the Air Force H.Q. in IBRAHIM Utca on 15th November, they found that they were required to appear before a special Commission, which consisted of (Colonel) SZEKERES, Political Department of the Air Force, (Colonel) WOLF, Anti-Aircraft Command, (Lieutenant-Colonel) ANDRIKO, Major HINEK, H.Q. staff, (Major) BAKOS, Counter-Espionage, and Major KAUFMANN, Engineering Service. The Commission had set itself the task of persuading each officer screened by it, to reconsider his decision to resign his commission. It was stressed that the intention was to form a separate and elite officer militia force from the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Commands, and moreover, it was said that the Air Force was not, as stated by Brigadier-General HORVATH at the PETOFI Barracks on 11th November, to be disbanded; in fact, they were told that the Russians were handing back the aircraft to the Hungarian Air Force, and that this would happen soon after 20th November.

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[redacted] this date was certainly one chosen at random, just to lend force to the argument.

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at Major HORVATH's home. At this meeting, the officers were informed by Major KAUFMANN that he had had a telephone call from Colonel NADOR; the latter had stressed to KAUFMANN that it was absolutely essential that the Air Force should not be allowed to go to rack and ruin, because he was safe in the Yugoslav Embassy, and had been carrying on negotiations with KADAR on the question of the re-organisation of the Hungarian Air Force and his, i.e., NADOR's appointment as its commander. He had apparently asked KAUFMANN to contact as many officers as possible and to ask them to be present on Monday, 19th November at the new Air Force H.Q., when NADOR himself would come and would have many interesting things to tell them.

63. KAUFMANN then said that it was essential that this gathering at HORVATH's house should be kept as secret as possible, and that on no account should any leakage get to the ears of MADARASZ. He said that this was essential because an accusation had been put forward against Colonel NADOR by (Brigadier-General) HAZAI of the Political Department to the effect that NADOR had been guilty of giving Hungarian Military secrets away during the visit, in October, of a new type of [] transport plane which had been demonstrated at FERIEGY airfield. 25X1

64. The assembled officers were all extremely suspicious as to the truth of what KAUFMANN told them, as it was well known that he was attempting to ingratiate himself with the pro-revolutionary section of the officer corps, at the same time making sure that he was sufficiently strongly ensconced in the MADARASZ camp to ensure his future if MADARASZ came back to power. They felt that there was a strong possibility that there had been no telephone conversation with NADOR, but decided that they would turn up at the H.Q. on 19th November, just in case, and that should NADOR be present they would warn him of their suspicions of any negotiations which the KADAR Government might have been carrying out with him, on the question of the re-organisation of the Hungarian Air Force, since it was well-known that the pro-Russian Air Force hierarchy, under MADARASZ, were well aware of NADOR's pro-revolutionary sympathies and his desire to bring about the creation of an independent Hungarian Air Force.

65. On Saturday, 17th November, a second radio announcement was made by MUNICH Ferenc, who had now been appointed Minister of the Interior, instructing all military personnel to report to their units or offices by five p.m. on Sunday, 18th November. It was stated that those who did not do so would be automatically posted as deserters. 25X1

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67. On Monday, 19th November, some 90% of the Hungarian Air Force [redacted] officer/[redacted] turned up. There was, of course, no sign of Colonel NADOR, and instead, the officers were presented with a declaration of loyalty to the KADAR regime, which they were required to sign; those officers who were prepared to sign this declaration were to be incorporated into the officer militia which was being formed, and would be issued with a new bilingual Hungarian/Russian military identity document. 25X1

68. The declaration ran roughly as follows:

"I recognise the Workers' and Peasants' Government headed by KADAR Janos, and the political programme and aims of this Government.

"I recognise and appreciate the necessity for the Russian intervention, since our country was threatened by a Fascist revolution.

"I am prepared to take part in military action on the side of the SOVIET UNION against Fascists, even though I realise that many of them are merely misled.

"I recognise the need for and am in favour of Hungarian/Russian friendship.

"I shall unconditionally obey all orders given to me."

69. As may be imagined, the presentation of this declaration for signature by all officers caused an uproar in the Hungarian Air Force H.Q. (Colonel) SZEKERES and (Major) TOKES, of the Political Department, together with Major HINEK, did their utmost to talk officers into signing the declaration, using all kinds of blandishment and making many offers of personal advancement and preferential treatment for officers who would sign. Moreover, Captain DOZSA (Party Secretary for the Hungarian Air Force) attempted to trick the officers into signing by several times telephoning to the old Headquarters of the Air Force on GELLERT Hill (which was, of course, occupied by the Russians) to ask whether Colonel NADOR had yet arrived there, and if so, to be sure to tell him to come across to the new Headquarters in IBRAHIM Utcá, where the assembled officers awaited him.

70. Despite these promises and tricks, some 90 or 95% of the officers, who were by this time in an extremely nervous and short-tempered frame of mind, would have nothing to do with signing the declaration. They almost all had relatives working in factories, and as the general strike was now in full swing, it was quite obvious to them that if they remained in the forces they were liable to be ordered out to fight against the strikers. Refusing to sign the declaration, they took a legal stand on the Hungarian Armed Forces Regulation which stated that no person in the the Armed Forces would be required to take up arms against his own countrymen.

71. This 95% of the officer corps in the H.Q. were then given temporary demobilisation documents which had to be handed in to the district Military Commandatura, in exchange for a certificate which would authorise the police to provide them with new civilian identity cards.

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Appendix A

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THE PART PLAYED BY HUNGARIAN YOUTH IN THE REVOLUTION

1. [] the youth of the country had been brought up as Communists, and promised that with the establishment of Communism throughout the country and the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plans, the country would be raised from the state of poverty which existed, and generally attributed to World War II and to earlier capitalist exploitation.

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2. It was this section of the population, brought up on Communist theory, which was able to see the complete discrepancy which existed between that theory and actual practice, which was the first to be disillusioned.

3. The part played by the youth of the country in the military action during the revolution is perhaps most easily understood against the background of indoctrination to which they were subjected by Communist youth organisations.

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4. [] one of these organisations [] the "Fighters for Freedom" (not to be confused with the title given to the revolutionaries of "Freedom Fighters"). In this organisation, the members were taught to fly, mainly gliders and small sports aircraft; to handle weapons; and instructed in radio techniques. They were subjected constantly to programmes of Soviet propaganda films, a large number of which were devoted to the subject of the glorious heroes of the Soviet partisan groups in the Second World War. Bearing directly on these partisan films, the youth organisations taught their members methods of street fighting shown in the films, and it was these very methods, such as the use of Molotov Cocktails against armoured vehicles, which were eventually turned against Russian troops during the Hungarian revolt. Moreover, [] these youth organisations had at its disposal a limited supply of arms and ammunition for the training programme, and the first action of members on joining the revolt was to take over these supplies for use against the Russians.

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5. On 25th October, between five and six in the evening, a demonstration was passing the ASTORIA Hotel in BUDAPEST, where a number of Russian tanks were stationed. As the demonstrators passed, all the guns of the tanks were trained on them, but a young Hungarian, carrying the Hungarian National flag, walked calmly up to the nearest tank and climbed on top. A Russian officer opened the turret hatch and looked out, to be greeted by the Hungarian youth, who handed him the Hungarian flag. As a result, the Russian tanks formed up as a friendly escort for the demonstrators, who were on their way to the Parliament building. On arrival in Parliament Square, a number of Russian tanks were found to be stationed there also; they, too, were in readiness to fire on the demonstrators, but on realising that the escorting tanks had come out in sympathy with the demonstrators, the crews of the tanks gathered outside the Parliament Building did likewise. While all this was going on, AVO troops stationed on the roof of the Ministry of Agriculture, opposite the Parliament Building, began to fire on the demonstrators, killing the Russian officer who had originally welcomed the demonstrators at the ASTORIA Hotel. The Russian tanks immediately opened fire on the AVO troops and a general melee ensued, which unfortunately resulted in indiscriminate firing, and eventually ended with the Russian troops fighting the demonstrators, and, incidentally, the AVO.

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6. At the MARIA-THERESIA Barracks in BUDAPEST, it is known that Russian troops wearing Russian uniform, put on red, white and green Hungarian armbands, and fought on the side of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters against the AVO. In GYONGYOS, a complete company of Russian infantry is known to have handed over its arms to the Hungarian fighters. At GYOR, a Russian tank squadron which was ordered to fire on Hungarian Freedom Fighters absolutely refused to do so.

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7. [] these incidents of Soviet troops sympathising with the Hungarian revolutionaries was confined to the early stages of the revolt and was certainly because the Russian troops who had been stationed in the country for some time know the conditions there, and fully realised that the people against whom they were being ordered to fight were the ordinary men and women in the street, and not, as propaganda was putting out, groups of Fascist revolutionaries. This sympathy must undoubtedly have been responsible for the Russian decision to replace the troops stationed in HUNGARY with fresh troops brought in from the SOVIET UNION and from other Satellite countries.

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8. [] there is evidence to indicate that of the Russian troops who declined to fight against Hungarians, or who went so far as to take an active part on their side, the vast majority were from the outlying Soviet republics, in other words, from minority groups.

Appendix B

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NOTE ON AVO TO ADD TO END OF DIARY

When the Russian troops moved out of BUDAPEST after the cease fire on October 28th a great many of the AVO troops went with them and eventually returned "in Russian uniforms" on the 4th November. This fact came to light on many occasions when after the fighting died down around 10 November Hungarian workers on strike walked past columns of Russian troops mouthing expletives at them. On many such occasions the Hungarian workers were surprised to be answered back in Hungarian of such fluency as to leave no doubt as to the nationality of the speaker despite the disguise of Russian uniform.

The most active section of the AVO during the revolt was the special R group which was commanded by Major General PIROS. This group co-operated actively with the Soviet troops in arresting "rebels".